Insolvency proceedings face two fundamental challenges that, at their core, concern maximizing the value of an insolvent firm and allocating that value among its stakeholders. In our recent article, Rethinking Priority Rules in Insolvency, we focus on the second challenge, examining how jurisdictions structure priority rules and assessing their economic and policy justifications.
Priority rules determine who bears losses when companies fail. They also influence decisions made long before insolvency, including investment, risk-taking, financing, and creditor monitoring. Their design therefore has important implications for access to finance, corporate restructuring, and the distribution of losses among stakeholders.
Our article argues that two foundational principles of insolvency law—the protection of pre-insolvency entitlements and the equal treatment of similarly situated creditors—should generally be respected. Nevertheless, departures may be justified where they generate economic benefits or protect creditors who cannot adequately protect themselves.
The treatment of secured creditors provides an important example. Secured lending facilitates access to finance and can reduce borrowing costs. However, as Bebchuk and Fried have convincingly argued, granting secured creditors full priority may generate inefficiencies. It can allow borrowers and secured lenders to shift risks onto creditors unable to adjust to them, encourage excessive investment and risk-taking, and weaken incentives to monitor the debtor’s overall financial condition rather than merely the value of collateral. At the same time, however, reducing secured creditors’ priority may increase borrowing costs, restrict credit, and discourage investment. Therefore, in the absence of further evidence showing that the benefits of departing from full priority outweigh these potential costs, we favor preserving secured creditors’ priority as the general rule, while recognizing that exceptions may be justified in certain circumstances.
Employees provide an important example. They are particularly vulnerable to their employer's insolvency because their investment in the firm is often undiversified and firm-specific, and they generally lack the information and bargaining power needed to protect themselves. Our paper therefore argues that employees should receive special protection in insolvency. Whether that protection should take the form of priority over other creditors, including secured creditors, however, is a separate question.
As documented by Davis, Pargendler, and Lessa, jurisdictions have adopted different approaches to protecting employees in insolvency. While many countries in the Global North rely primarily on wage guarantee funds, several jurisdictions in the Global South, including India and Brazil, grant certain employee claims priority even over secured creditors. They argue that one possible explanation for these differences is that countries in the Global South may face greater institutional and financial constraints in establishing effective wage guarantee schemes, making insolvency priority an alternative means of protecting employees.
In our view, wage guarantee funds generally provide more effective protection for employees, since they allow workers to recover their unpaid wages, subject to appropriate limits, regardless of the debtor’s remaining assets. Moreover, they may avoid some of the adverse effects on the cost and availability of credit associated with granting employees priority over secured creditors. However, wage guarantee funds are not costless, as they must be financed by employers, the government, or both. Therefore, apart from the institutional and financial constraints identified by Davis, Pargendler, and Lessa, a broader question arises as to whether wage guarantee funds are socially preferable to insolvency-based priority. We argue that this is ultimately an empirical question. From a policy perspective, the primary objective should not be to grant employees priority in insolvency, but to ensure that they are adequately protected. The most appropriate and cost-effective means of achieving that objective, however, may vary across jurisdictions.
A different conclusion emerges from our analysis of the priority granted to tax authorities and other public claims in many jurisdictions. We question the traditional justifications for granting preferential treatment to public creditors in insolvency proceedings. Governments generally have greater capacity to diversify their revenue sources and stronger collection powers than private creditors. Granting priority to public claims also reduces recoveries for other creditors, potentially increasing borrowing costs and discouraging investment. We therefore advocate abolishing the priority granted to tax authorities and other public creditors, particularly in countries with inefficient public sectors, where transferring additional resources from private creditors to the government may be especially difficult to justify.
Another area in which we challenge existing approaches concerns shareholder loans. Several jurisdictions, particularly in Continental Europe and Latin America, automatically subordinate loans provided by shareholders. These rules seek to address legitimate concerns about shareholder opportunism. When a company approaches insolvency, controlling shareholders may have incentives to pursue excessively risky investments or continue operating a business that is no longer economically viable, hoping that its financial condition will eventually improve. By providing loans instead of equity, shareholders may also retain a creditor claim while preserving the potential benefits of a successful turnaround.
However, we argue that mandatory subordination may create greater problems than it solves. Shareholder loans are often a quick, flexible, and relatively inexpensive source of financing, particularly for small businesses. Automatically subordinating them may discourage shareholders from lending even to solvent companies. More importantly, when a company experiences financial distress, its shareholders may be among the few parties willing and able to provide additional funding. Subordinating their loans may therefore discourage financing that could preserve economically viable businesses precisely when they need it most.
The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic reinforces these concerns. Recognizing the importance of shareholder financing during a period of widespread financial distress, several countries in Europe and Latin America temporarily suspended the mandatory subordination of shareholder loans. However, the financing constraints that motivated these measures are not exclusive to a pandemic. Many businesses, particularly smaller firms, face similar difficulties in obtaining external financing under normal economic conditions. These constraints become even more severe when a company experiences financial distress, even if its business remains economically viable. We therefore argue that the rationale for suspending mandatory subordination during the pandemic supports abolishing these rules altogether.
Abolishing mandatory subordination does not mean that shareholder opportunism should be ignored. We argue that the associated risks should instead be addressed through more targeted mechanisms, including directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency and avoidance actions against preferential transactions. Even case-by-case subordination, although potentially feasible in jurisdictions with sophisticated courts, may create uncertainty and discourage valuable financing, particularly in countries with less predictable judicial institutions.
Our paper also examines several priority rules that have attracted renewed attention in debates surrounding environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations and mass tort bankruptcies. Tort victims are particularly deserving of protection because, unlike voluntary creditors, they cannot negotiate contractual safeguards before suffering harm. Ideally, their protection should be achieved through mandatory liability insurance or other mechanisms operating outside insolvency. Where these are unavailable or insufficient, however, granting tort claims priority may be justified.
Environmental claims raise related concerns. Companies responsible for pollution may enter insolvency proceedings without sufficient assets to satisfy their environmental obligations. While environmental regulation and insurance should generally address these risks, insolvency law may need to provide additional protection where those mechanisms are inadequate. In such circumstances, granting environmental claims priority, potentially as administrative expenses, may be preferable to exempting environmental obligations from the automatic stay, which can disrupt the restructuring of economically viable businesses.
We also examine how insolvency systems can encourage companies to obtain new financing and pay the costs of insolvency proceedings without generating undesirable economic effects. Granting priority to debtor-in-possession financing and necessary administrative expenses can facilitate the restructuring of viable firms. However, these priorities must be accompanied by appropriate safeguards. Otherwise, they may encourage the inefficient continuation of non-viable businesses or unnecessarily dilute the recoveries of existing creditors, potentially increasing borrowing costs and restricting access to finance. We argue that the appropriate safeguards, including the role of creditors in approving new financing, should depend partly on the competence and reliability of courts and insolvency practitioners in a particular jurisdiction.
Finally, our article examines whether shareholders should be allowed to retain an interest in a reorganized company when creditors have not been paid in full. While we generally favor respecting the absolute priority rule to protect creditors’ pre-insolvency entitlements and limit opportunistic behavior, exceptions may be justified where their economic benefits outweigh their potential costs. This may be particularly relevant in small business reorganizations, where strict adherence to absolute priority can increase restructuring costs and discourage the timely reorganization of economically viable businesses. Any such exceptions should nevertheless be clearly defined and carefully designed to minimize uncertainty and opportunistic behavior.
Ultimately, our analysis suggests that the appropriate design of priority rules cannot be determined independently of the economic and institutional environment in which they operate. Although certain general principles should guide insolvency reform, countries differ in their financial systems, ownership structures, institutional capacity, and available mechanisms for protecting vulnerable creditors. Policymakers should therefore begin by identifying the policy objectives they seek to achieve, whether protecting employees, addressing environmental harm, facilitating rescue financing, or preventing shareholder opportunism. They should then consider the available instruments, including those operating outside insolvency law, and assess which can achieve those objectives most effectively and at the lowest social cost. The resulting framework should be tailored to each country’s market conditions and institutional environment.
The full version of the article can be found here.
Anthony J. Casey is the Donald M. Ephraim Professor of Law and Economics and Faculty Director of the Center on Law and Finance at the University of Chicago Law School.
Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez is a Professor of Law and Head of the Singapore Global Restructuring Initiative at Singapore Management University.
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