The bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma generated widespread controversy over whether the Sackler family could obtain protection from civil liability without filing for bankruptcy themselves. Much of the public discussion focused on the steadily increasing amounts the Sacklers agreed to contribute to Purdue’s creditors. Their initial commitment of $3 billion ultimately became a settlement requiring at least $6.5 billion.
The assumption that these increases represented substantially greater economic sacrifices by the Sacklers cannot withstand scrutiny. Examining the terms and timing of successive agreements, it turns out that the family’s ultimate financial commitment was roughly equivalent, in present-value terms, to what it agreed to before Purdue filed for bankruptcy in September 2019. Indeed, depending on the appropriate discount rate, the Sacklers may have benefited financially from the prolonged litigation. Moreover, they face little risk that they will face additional civil liability.
The additional litigation had differing consequences for creditors. Although objections by certain state governments produced meaningful increases in their recoveries, the US Trustee’s successful Supreme Court challenge to nonconsensual third-party releases likely reduced the economic value available to the personal injury claimants.
I. The Settlement Framework and Subsequent Agreements
Purdue faced thousands of lawsuits brought by governments, hospitals, insurers, and individual victims of opioid addiction. The Sacklers also faced potential liability, some for having operated the company and all of them as a group having received more than $10 billion in distributions from Purdue between 2008 and 2017. They sought protection against civil claims while avoiding personal bankruptcy.
Negotiations beginning in 2018 produced a Settlement Framework under which the Sacklers would contribute $3 billion over seven years and surrender their Purdue ownership interests, including their foreign pharmaceutical businesses, principally held through Mundipharma. The proceeds from the foreign sales would offset the family’s required contributions, but additional proceeds could generate payments to claimants exceeding $3 billion.
The First Funding Agreement, incorporated into Purdue’s initial plan of reorganization, required the Sacklers to contribute $4.275 billion over approximately nine years. The bankruptcy court confirmed the first plan of reorganization in September 2021. However, nine governmental jurisdictions opposed the plan, principally because it granted nonconsensual releases protecting the Sacklers. The district court reversed confirmation, concluding that the Bankruptcy Code did not authorize those releases.
This decision altered the parties’ bargaining positions. Because dissenting governments could pursue their claims against the Sacklers unless they consented to the releases, the Sacklers negotiated the Second Funding Agreement in March 2022. The agreement added $1 billion in guaranteed payments, increasing the Sacklers’ commitment to $5.275 billion, with up to another $500 million contingent on foreign asset sales.
The Second Circuit subsequently upheld the bankruptcy court’s authority to approve nonconsensual releases. The US Trustee pursued Supreme Court review. In June 2024, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Code did not authorize the contested releases.
Following further negotiations, a new plan was confirmed in November 2025 and became effective May 1, 2026. The Third Funding Agreement, which is the basis for the effective plan, requires $6.5 billion in payments over fifteen years, potentially increasing to $7 billion.
The new plan preserves claims against the Sacklers unless the claimants consent to their release. However, it also permits the Sacklers to divert up to $800 million of their promised contributions toward defending and satisfying claims brought by nonsettling plaintiffs. Because this diversion would reduce funds available to settling personal injury claimants, the arrangement creates powerful incentives against additional litigation.
II. Comparing the Economic Value of the Agreements
Using February 16, 2022, as a common valuation date, the essay calculates the present value of each funding agreement at discount rates of 3%, 5%, 7%, and 10%.
These calculations demonstrate that the Second Funding Agreement represented a genuine economic improvement for creditors. The discount rate at which the First and Second Funding Agreements have identical present values is 17.51%, substantially higher than ordinary investment-return assumptions.
The comparison between the Second and Third Funding Agreements produces a different result. Their present values are equal at a discount rate of 5.61%. Above that rate, the Third Funding Agreement is less costly to the Sacklers, despite requiring substantially greater nominal payments.
The indifference rate between the First and Third Funding Agreements is 8.53%. Thus, if the Sacklers could earn returns exceeding that rate on retained assets, their ultimate obligation would actually be less burdensome than their commitment under the first confirmed plan.
The calculations demonstrate that the supposedly dramatic increases in the Sacklers’ contributions are substantially less impressive after accounting for the time value of money.
III. Consequences for Different Creditor Groups
Under the original confirmed plan, personal injury claimants would have received approximately $700 million, distributed between 2022 and 2026. Under the implemented plan, they received approximately $865.8 million in May 2026.
Comparing these payments alone, the indifference discount rate is 7.87%. However, the original plan separately allocated $60 million to medical monitoring claims, while the implemented plan combines those claims with personal injury recoveries. Including both categories lowers the indifference rate to 4.8%. Consequently, personal injury claimants with discount rates exceeding 4.8% would have benefited from the earlier plan.
Third-party payors also fared poorly from delay. Their nominal recoveries increased from $365 million to approximately $395 million, but their indifference discount rate is only 2.8%. Above that rate, the original plan offered greater economic value.
The litigation undertaken by the nine dissenting jurisdictions improved their bargaining position and increased governmental recoveries overall. The subsequent Supreme Court litigation, by contrast, likely diminished the economic value of the overall settlement.
IV. Institutional Incentives and the Costs of Delay
The dissenting states pursued additional litigation because they stood to obtain greater recoveries. The district court’s ruling gave them bargaining leverage, and their strategy ultimately secured additional financial commitments from the Sacklers.
The US Trustee operated under different incentives. Its institutional responsibility concerns the integrity and consistent administration of the bankruptcy system rather than maximizing recoveries in an individual case. Purdue presented an especially attractive opportunity to resolve the longstanding controversy over nonconsensual third-party releases.
The US Trustee succeeded in obtaining a definitive Supreme Court ruling. Nevertheless, that institutional victory came at a financial cost. The additional delay reduced the value of promised payments, while the final plan’s litigation-financing provisions substantially limited the practical value of preserving individual claims against the Sacklers.
Conclusion
The Purdue bankruptcy illustrates three broader lessons.
First, nominal settlement amounts can be profoundly misleading when payments extend over many years. Evaluating settlements requires attention to timing and present value.
Second, legal rulings shape bargaining power. The district court’s rejection of nonconsensual releases compelled the Sacklers to negotiate with dissenting states to obtain their consent to release their claims against the Sacklers, producing meaningful economic gains for the states.
Third, the incentives of institutional actors may diverge from those of injured creditors. Although the US Trustee achieved an important legal victory, the resulting delay likely reduced recoveries for many claimants.
Ultimately, the Sacklers obtained substantial protection against future civil liability while making a financial contribution broadly consistent with their original settlement expectations.
The author’s paper, forthcoming in the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, is available here.
Robert K Rasmussen is the J Thomas McCarthy Trustee Chair in Law and Political Science at the USC Gould School of Law.
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