The EU, Rwanda and the Commodification of Migration

As European states turn to Rwanda as a destination for deported migrants, new ‘return hub’ proposals raise questions about the commodification of migration and who ultimately benefits.

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Guest post by Nicola Palmer. Nicola is an Associate Professor in Public Law at the University of Cape Town and the thematic co-lead for Border Criminologies’ work on ‘Law and the Courts’. 

a building and palm trees

Hope Hostel in Kigali, 4 November 2026. Photo: Nicola Palmer

Rwanda has been announced as the preferred location for the first migration ‘return hub’ for EU member states Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Greece and Denmark. While much of the commentary has emphasized how this agreement is distinct from the failed  ‘Migration and Economic Development Partnership’ (MEDP) between the UK and Rwanda, primarily because Rwandan authorities will not be determining the asylum claims of the people transferred to the ‘return hub’, there is much that is the same. 

First, like the UK scheme, it allows for the forced transfers of people to a country where they have no prior personal connection. This latest forced relocation applies to people who have been issued a ‘return decision’ by an EU member state under the  EU’s new Return Regulation which came into force on 17 October 2026. 

Second, these ‘return hubs’ form part of a growing practice of regressive asylum agreements, where wealthier First World/Global North states displace both their obligations and the costs of offering refuge onto Third World/Global South states.

Forced Relocation and ‘Migration Diplomacy’

The Rwandan government has positioned itself at the heart of these agreements. In addition to the four people who voluntarily moved to Rwanda under the UK’s MEDP, since April 2025, 23 people have been forcibly deported from the US, as part of the Trump Administration’s extensive set of bi-lateral deportation agreements reached with 15 African and 18 Latin American states. The intention is for 250 more people to be deported from the US and 100 people initially from the EU states.

The Rwandan government is acutely aware of how European and North American anti-immigrant policymaking offers scope for what Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas term ‘migration diplomacy’. Rwanda has engaged in diplomatic negotiations on forced deportations with the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and the US for more than ten years. In these earlier negotiations, Rwanda pursued the more discrete, but nonetheless politically important, goal of securing the deportation or extradition of genocide suspects to Rwanda. In 2014, Emmanuel Mbarushimana was extradited from Denmark to Rwanda, following the revocation of his Danish residency permit based on allegations of involvement in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. A year later, Jean de Dieu Munyaneza was deported from the Netherlands, having had his Dutch residency permit revoked on similar grounds. This was followed in 2016 by the extradition of Jean-Claude Iyamuremye and Jean Baptiste Mugimba and most recently Vénant Rutunga in 2021, again following the revocation of their Dutch residency permits. Meanwhile, in Germany, Jean Twagiramungu was extradited in 2017 based on his alleged involvement in the genocide. As I have previously argued, these efforts have been underpinned both by the Rwandan government’s desire to secure criminal accountability for the genocide and its efforts to discipline diaspora populations and to limit opportunities for opposition political organizing outside of the country.

Article 2 (4) of the new EU Regulation makes clear that it will not apply to any third-country national who is subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction. However, under Article 5, a Member state can extend the Regulation to apply to those nationals if notification is given to the other Member States and to the Commission. The genesis of Rwanda’s role in these new migrations deals is found in criminal deportations and extraditions and these practices will continue alongside them.

Financial Incentives and Refugee Marketisation

While the details of the planned agreement with Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Greece and Denmark are yet to be announced, prior agreements suggest the deal will include an important economic aspect – a practice Neha Jain has usefully described as ‘refugee marketisation’. Before the termination of the MEDP, Rwanda had received £290 million from the UK, with an additional £425 million spent on the scheme inside the UK. The current Memorandum of Understanding reached with the US specifies that Rwanda will be paid $7.5 million, having already received $100,000 in a bespoke deal relating to the deportation of Iraqi national Omar Abdulsattar Ameen in April 2025. 

These agreements coincide with a host of trade agreements relating to critical mineral extraction, highlighting various legal consistencies across these migration and mineral deals. According to the Rwandan Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board, over the past seven years (2017–2024), Rwanda's mineral exports have more than tripled – from $373 million in 2017 to $1.75 billion in 2024. As part of this mining boom, the EU and Rwanda signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains on 19 February 2024 and Rwanda entered into the ‘Regional Economic Integration Framework’ (REIF) – also focusing on trade in critical minerals with the US and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – in December 2025. This has all occurred as the military occupation by M23 rebels in the eastern DRC has continued, with the rebels controlling coltan mines near Rubaya in North Kivu province, and Lomera, a gold mining site in South Kivu province. Amnesty International claims that these minerals are being trafficked into Rwanda before entering both the legal and illegal global mineral markets.

Just Passing Through

Law determines the boundaries between licit and illicit markets. These markets relate to both the movement of people across borders and the sale of critical minerals. The rapidly changing immigration rules in the EU and its member states involve the forced transfer of people who have been designated as falling on the ‘illegal’ side of that division, and the number of people falling into this category is routinely  expanding. 

According to diplomatic sources in Kigali reported in the Guardian, migrants deported as part of the ‘return hub’ would stay in a reception centre in Rwanda for a couple of months, before choosing to integrate into Rwandan life or return to their home nation. One would presume that this integration will require some determination of their immigration status in Rwanda. It is not clear whether the EU states’ ‘return decisions’ would be applied to individuals whose asylum applications were denied because they were deemed ‘inadmissible’ on a technical point or only those that have failed to establish a real risk of persecution if returned to their home country. If they include ‘inadmissible’ decisions, this would mean that, like the MEDP before it, people with a legitimate asylum claim could be sent to Rwanda, but without any obligations on Rwanda to assess those applications. 

The Hope Hostel Ltd, initially built as Rwandan government-funded housing for 1994 genocide survivors, then renovated as part of the MEDP to house asylum applicants sent from the UK, is now packaged as a private accommodation, restaurant and wedding venue. A room costs 20,000 Rwandan francs (around £10) per night. There is a prayer room, which has a startlingly beautiful view of the Kigali hills and the kitchen has a large sign designating it as Halal. These aspects of the hostel were envisaged as meeting the needs of the Iraqi and Afghan nationals who formed part of the cohort of asylum seekers first selected to be forcibly sent from the UK. The 42 available rooms are currently empty. This is not where the 23 people forcibly deported from the US are being housed. 

Rather than a ‘return hub’, Rwanda will act as a very lucrative ‘transit hub’ in this new proposed structure. People trying to get to Europe who fall on the wrong side of the EU member states’ classifications of legal and illegal migration will simply pass through town, on their way to pursuing the promise of a better life. In this respect, while their circumstances and freedom of movement could hardly be more different, they share something with the wealthy European mining investors, making deals at Kivu Noir, the latest high-end café in Kigali. They are all just passing through, along with the coltan, gold, tin, tungsten and tantalum that is being sold. The question, though, is where the benefits of all this movement are ultimately accumulating.

How to cite this blog post (Harvard style):

N. Palmer. (2026) The EU, Rwanda and the Commodification of Migration. Available at:https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/border-criminologies-blog/blog-post/2026/11/eu-rwanda-and-commodification-migration. Accessed on: 18/11/2026