Releasing abusers, harassing the victims: the “criminal pact” of a new migration governance in the making? 

Guest post by Luca Raineri and Diego Caballero-Vélez. Luca Raineri is assistant professor in security studies at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies of Pisa, Italy. His work investigates transnational security phenomena (terrorism, organized crime, migration, climate change) in the EU extended Mediterranean neighbourhood and Africa at large. He is the author of numerous scientific publications in international academic journals, contributions in books and monographs - including La Crisi Libica e l'Ordine Internazionale (ed. Carocci, 2022).  Diego Caballero-Vélez is postdoctoral researcher at the University of Messina, Italy, where he works on European migration governance in the Mediterranean. He earned his PhD at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies and was previously a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Warsaw. His research interests cover political economy, international migration governance, security studies, and EU foreign policy. His research has appeared in European Politics and Society, International Migration, and Perspectives on Politics. He is the author of Contesting Migration Crises in Central Eastern Europe, published in 2023 by Palgrave 

On 19 January 2025, Osama Najeem Almasry, one of the leaders of the Libyan judicial police, was briefly arrested by Italian authorities in Turin on an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant. Najeem faced allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including torture, rape, and murder, reportedly perpetrated at Mitiga prison and other detention facilities near Tripoli, where he served as director on behalf of the paramilitary group Special Deterrence Force (SDF). Kept secret until the day before, as customary, Almasry’s arrest warrant was based on vast amounts of evidence collected by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, targeted fact-finding missions, and the victims’ allegations. Less than 48 hours after his arrest, however, Almasry was discreetly released and repatriated to Libya on a state-organised flight. The swift handling of the Almasry’s case has raised concerns over Italy’s commitment to international justice and its compliance with ICC obligations. While Italian authorities unconvincingly point at “the immense mess” allegedly made by the ICC, resulting in procedural irregularities, the decision to return Almasry without formal extradition proceedings highlights broader issues of national security, diplomacy, and border governance, contributing to a growing impunity and violations of migrants’ rights within EUropean migration management. 

Strategic release? The effects of “reverse conditionality” in border control 

Italy’s violation of the ICC Statute is unprecedented. Yet making sense of it is not straightforward. One may argue that, by refusing to hand over Almasry, Italy was trying to avoid the opening of the Libya trial before the ICC, which might have led to uncover Rome’s responsibilities in the violations of migrants’ rights. This conjecture is only partly convincing. Mitiga is a key detention facility, but less for migrants than for alleged criminals, terrorists and political opponents. As a result, Almasry’s indictment had less to do with migrants’ rights, than with violations against Libyans. Why then compromise Italy’s international reputation to save from prosecution a serial abuser of limited use to Italy’s crusade against irregular migration?  

More evidently, Almasry mattered because of his prominence within the SDF, one of the pillars of Libya’s “stabilization” that Italy has been pursuing, and the EU endorsing, since 2015. Libya’s stability is viewed as key to securing a variety of Italian and EUropean interests in the country, including oil flows, limiting Russian influence, and curtailing migration. By protecting Almasry, even at the cost of violating international law, Italy signalled to its Libyan partners its (reckless) commitment to preserving a status quo that profits Libyan and Italian elites alike. Almasry’s return to Libya with Rome providing a state flight and rolling out the red carpet is possibly instrumental to reaffirming this “gentlemen” agreement. As part of this pact, one may argue, Italy also aimed to pre-empt any risk of retaliation just as happened a few weeks before when Iranian authorities jailed an Italian journalist in Teheran to obtain the release of an Iranian wanted arrested in Milan. In fact, a few days after the Almasry accident, the head of Italian intelligence flew to Tripoli, where his theoretically secret visit was unceremoniously made known by Libyan sources. 

This dynamic is arguably indicative of a meaningful shift, whereby EU neighbouring countries leverage their positions, most evidently as it results from the EU migration containment policy, to extract concessions in the name of “stability”. In 2016, for instance, Turkey capitalised on Europe's desperation to control migration by imposing its own conditions before agreeing to contain the massive migration flows, leading to the so-called EU-Turkey deal. Similarly, Morocco leveraged its strategic location to negotiate development and political partnerships with the EU and its Member States, including about the status of Western Sahara, in exchange for curbing irregular migration. In the complex dynamics between Italy and Libya, too, Libyan authorities have often threatened to “turn Europe black” unless Rome abided by their conditions.  

These dynamics represent cases of “reversed conditionality”, where non-EU countries dictate terms to the EU rather than the other way around. By outsourcing border control to third countries, the EU has strengthened the bargaining power of origin and transit states, allowing them to obtain privileges irrespective of their democratic credentials or the legitimacy of their demands. These states are no longer mere enforcers of EU migration policies; they have become active negotiators, turning border enforcement into a powerful tool for diplomatic and economic gain. 

The swift release of Almasry by Italian authorities underscores Libya’s strategic position as a crucial partner for Italy and highlights the spillover effects of reversed conditionality. Rather than imposing strict conditions, Italy appears to have exercised caution, even at the cost of undermining international institutions and reputation, aware that Libya’s “stability” is essential for maintaining border security and managing migration flows. This furthermore seems to indicate an evolving dimension of reversed conditionality, whereby not only states but also non-state actors involved in border control, such as militias, security forces, and private actors, play a significant role in shaping migration governance. 

Silent leverage: The role of intelligence in migration diplomacy 

The quiet release of Almasry through intelligence channels rather than legal procedures highlights how border management  increasingly shaped by opaque, extra-legal mechanisms that bypass formal judicial and administrative safeguards. Rather than relying on transparent bilateral agreements that, at least formally, include human rights protection, these backroom arrangements operate outside established legal frameworks, creating grey zones of legal enforcement. Such practices systematically erode the rule of law and violate fundamental legal principles, including protection against arbitrary detention and refoulement. In this context, intelligence-led migration diplomacy not only recalibrates power relations between states but also creates informal spaces where binding legal obligations are suspended or selectively enforced. Migrants and asylum seekers are thus effectively denied international protection, including transparency and accountability regarding the actual rules – be they formal and informal – governing border crossings. 

One of the most insidious ways intelligence diplomacy undermines accountability, in fact, is through deniability. Governments can publicly claim to uphold international norms while simultaneously enabling the release of individuals involved in major human rights violations and enforcing border control behind the scenes. This process reinforces a culture of impunity, where the most severe abuses in migration enforcement, illegal pushbacks, arbitrary detention, and mistreatment of asylum seekers, become institutionally invisible, buried beneath intelligence agreements and covert operations. 

At the same time, the expanding role of the intelligence in migration governance, which Italy is arguably spearheading, can pave the way to abuses against human rights defenders in Europe, too. Just as the Almasry feuilleton was unfolding, the Italian audience learnt in appalment that an Israeli-made military spyware had been used to illegally spy on the private communications of some Italian activists. Worryingly, migrant rights’ defenders feature prominently among the targets, including the leaders of the rescue NGO Mediterranea Saving Humans, as well as the founder of Refugees in Libya, who had previously testified against Almasry. Amidst growing embarrassment, the Italian government had declared the matter “top secret”, until public pressure forced the intelligence to acknowledge responsibility of the operation.  

Combined, the Almasry and the spyware cases contribute to depicting a troubling scenario whereby criminal abusers, western far right governments and their tech-savvy intelligence agencies collude. Leveraging the obsession with migration control, they empower each other, paving the way to increasingly opaque governance of migration and borders which endorses criminal actors and practices. 

This post is part of the project Shut-Med “Securitizing Human Transit across the Central Mediterranean migratory corridor: shifting mobility governance discourses and practices in Italy, Malta, Libya, and Niger” financed by the Italian Ministry of University and Research under the  Research projects of relevant national interest (Programma Nazionale di Ricerca e Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale – PRIN) with the support of Next Generation EU fund. Research – Grant N. 2022NKLAFW, CUP J53D23005760006.  

Any comments about this post? Get in touch with us! Send us an email, or find us on LinkedIn and BlueSky.