From Informal Practices to Formal Policies: The Italian Approach to Border and Migration under the EU Pact 

Guest post by By Giulia Fabini and Valeria Ferraris. Valeria Ferraris holds an International PhD in Criminology and is an Associate Professor of Sociology of Law and Deviance at the University of Turin, Italy. Her research focuses on migration management and control, administrative detention, and the role of courts in migration-related issues. Giulia Fabini holds an international PhD in Law and Society and is an assistant professor of Sociology of Law and Deviance at the University of Bologna, Italy. Her research focuses on the processes of criminalization of migration, police practices and administrative detention. This post is part of a thematic series on the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, edited by Giuseppe Campesi and José Angel Brandariz. Read the introduction here.

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum is expected to bring significant changes to the mechanisms of migration management across EU member states. However, the extent of these changes and their actual impact will depend on the ways migration and borders have been managed so far in each national context.

The Italian model of border control

In Italy, informal control practices can be observed in all the key elements defining the Italian model of migration and border management: 

First, there is the widespread presence of illegalised migrants, combined with harsh migration policies and a hostile political discourse toward migration, alongside the marginal role of deportation.
In 2023, the number of irregularised migrants in Italy was estimated at approximately 458,000.
Despite ongoing processes producing migrants’ illegality, strict migration laws, hateful political rhetoric, and political promises of mass deportations, Italy’s deportation capacity remains limited. Only 4,000 to 6,000 are deported annually. Many more receive unenforceable deportation orders, leaving them illegalised and undeportable in Italy, or attempting  secondary migration to northern Europe. Structural limits to deportation stem from both resource constraints and the lack of comprehensive readmission agreements. Deportations primarily target specific nationalities: Tunisians make up the majority, followed by Nigerians, Egyptians, Albanians, and Georgians.

Second, there is the use of pre-removal detention not only as a deportation tool but also as a means of containment. This is coupled with new forms of detention upon entry, unlawful screening procedures, and informal or unlawful detention practices. Italy operates 10 pre-removal detention centers (CPRs) located near metropolitan areas or at border areas. In 2023, 6,714 migrants passed through these centers, while 2,987 were deported (44% of the total). On average, no more than 50% of detainees in Italian CPRs are deported annually. Immigration detention in Italy has also evolved over the past decade with the introduction of new forms of detention upon arrival. Between 2016 and 2022, 33,250 migrants passed through CPRs, while 222,418 passed through hotspots. Hotspots are often isolated in remote areas or on islands, and have effectively operated as centers of unlawful detention, keeping people inside for many days without judicial review. 

Additional detention centers for migrants under border procedures (with unclear legal statuses until recently) have been proliferating in the last few years. Locations for these centres include Pozzallo and Messina (Sicily), Roccella Ionica and Pantelleria, among other locations. More recently, offshore centers have been established in Albania.

The third key element is the role of police checks at internal borders and the continuum of confinement. Given the high number of illegalised migrants and limited deportation capacity, much of the governance falls to the police. Informal policing practices include identity checks, "invitations" to relocate, discouragement from using public spaces. Police often turn a blind eye to migrant illegality or issue unenforceable removal orders. This results in a constant movement of migrants between spaces of confinement and release. Migrants cycle through hotspots, CPRs, freedom, secondary migration, or re-entry into CPRs or even prison, only to return to CPRs once more.

In this system, informal control practices are as significant as formal ones. The impact of the EU Pact in Italy must therefore be understood in relation to the existence of these informal practices.

The EU pact

Given the current framework of border control mechanisms, the most significant impact of the EU Pact is likely to arise from four regulations: those on Screening and Eurodac (both covered in other posts in this blog series), and the regulations on international protection procedures and border return procedures. The latter two, in particular, establish closer links between asylum and return processes, ensuring that a negative asylum decision automatically triggers a return decision.

The screening regulation requires that individuals crossing the EU’s external borders undergo health, identity, and security checks. These checks must be completed within seven days at external borders or three days for those apprehended within the national territory. Following this screening, individuals are swiftly directed to the appropriate process—whether a border procedure, a regular asylum procedure, or a return procedure. The collected data will be stored in Eurodac for a wide spectrum of reasons (see blog post XY) and a broad range of individuals.

The international protection procedure regulation establishes a unified process for assessing asylum claims across Member States, focusing on speed over individual evaluations. Framed as fair and efficient, it aims to prevent asylum system abuse and reduce secondary movements within the EU. The process is limited to 12 weeks, during which applicants may remain at the border of a Member State but are not granted entry into its territory—a provision where the "non-entry fiction" plays a pivotal role.

The border asylum procedure becomes mandatory in three situations: when an applicant has deliberately misled authorities or destroyed/discarded identity or travel documents; when the applicant is deemed a threat to national security or public order; or when the applicant is a national of a third country classified as safe—defined as a country with an asylum recognition rate of 20% or lower.

Under the Pact, a rejected asylum application during the border procedure is automatically transferred to the border return procedure, which also has a maximum duration of 12 weeks. This expedited process is designed to facilitate swift returns.

The implementation of the border procedure, however, hinges on Member States’ capacity to handle both asylum applications and returns. This requires adequate infrastructure and trained personnel. 

The EU PACT and Italy: A ripple, not a tsunami

The primary impact of the EU Pact is likely to concern migration detention. Specifically, it may introduce new forms of confinement upon entry for asylum seekers and other individuals who, upon entering the country, are not admitted to asylum procedures and are categorized as illegalized migrants. This confinement could occur within Italian territory, at its borders, or even outside Italy, involving third countries. The concept of the "non-entry fiction" is particularly relevant here, as it allows individuals to be treated as if they have not formally entered Italian territory. However, the proliferation of new detention sites, not always clearly identified from a legal point of view has already been documented. In this sense, these experiments appear as anticipation of the logic underlining the EU Pact.

A similar dynamic can be observed with regard to the screening regulation. This regulation aims to formalize and regulate practices that have been taking place in Italian hotspots since 2015. Research has shown that screening practices in hotspots often involve categorizing migrants as asylum seekers or economic migrants under uncertain and informal conditions. While the EU Pact might formalize these practices, it remains unclear whether this formalization will improve or worsen the conditions faced by migrants.

Moreover, the screening regulation extends screening procedures beyond border areas to locations within the national territory. While screening practices by the police at internal borders already exist in some form, the regulation aims to enable authorities to cross-check migrant data across multiple EU databases.

Deportation processes may also be indirectly affected by the increased use of detention, the introduction of accelerated border procedures, and new readmission agreements with third countries classified as “safe.” A noteworthy development in this context is the recent agreement with Albania, which includes constructing a reception centre, a pre-removal centre, and a prison in Albania on a portion of Albanian territory temporarily ceded to Italy for five years. In September 2024, for the first time, migrants intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea were transported to Albania instead of Italy for screening procedures. However, following the reasoning of a European Court of Justice decision issued on October 4, which stated that a country cannot be considered safe if portions of its territory are deemed unsafe, on October 18, the Rome tribunal refused to validate the detention of migrants from countries classified as safe but considered unsafe for specific groups characterized by particular vulnerabilities. This resulted in the invalidation of all border procedures and the transfer of migrants to Italy to undergo standard asylum procedures. Currently, the use of the center in Albania is suspended pending clarification of the legal framework to support it.

In conclusion, many of the practices introduced under the EU Pact have already been informally implemented in Italy, raising concerns that the Pact may provide legal cover for pre-existing practices. On one hand, these practices are now being extended to other EU member states. The Pact’s formalization of these measures could legitimize them, raising critical questions about their broader implications.

Yet, structural aspects of Italy’s border management system—such as its historically low deportation rates—may prove resistant to change, regardless of new legal frameworks. For example, can deportations truly be expanded as envisioned by the Pact?  Policies only gain meaning through implementation by social actors, and entrenched limitations may remain difficult to overcome.

Interestingly, the formalization of informal practices could open up new opportunities to legally challenge their legitimacy. Previously, such challenges were not possible due to their informal nature. Codifying these practices could, therefore, create intriguing scenarios of counter-practices and legal challenges to the system’s mechanisms.

What seems most likely is the construction of new centers at Italian borders, increasing immigration detention and reinforcing the use of containment as a migration management strategy. However, this could also lead not to more migrants being deported but to more migrants becoming illegalized. The expansion of detention centers without adequate deportation capacity will likely result in more migrants being released into the territory as illegalized and undeportable, prompting more attempts at secondary movements toward northern EU countries. Similarly, as new border centers are constructed across the EU, there could be an increase in intra-European deportations, with migrants being sent back to Italy and then making their way north again, perpetuating a cycle.

This suggests the emergence of a new territorial dimension of the continuum of confinement, extending beyond the Italian context into the broader European sphere.