Indo-Myanmar Free Movement Regime: The illusion of decoloniality

Guest post by Masha Hassan. Masha is a PhD student in Global Histories, Cultures and Politics at the Department of History and Cultures, University of Bologna, Italy. Her Research project in Anthropology, supervised by Professor Luca Jourdan focuses on the self perceptions and identity constructions of migrant smugglers at the Italian borderlands.  

‘FMR (Free movement regime) or no FMR, we cannot be divided’, Federic (name changed), a two-wheeler taxi driver, stated quite firmly as he dodged potholes, mud flows and rockfalls during our one-hour bumpy ride to the border town called Zokhawthar. Nestled in the lush hills of the Northeastern state of India called Mizoram, in the Champhai district, this border town is a kilometre away from the Rikhawdar town, located in the Falam district of Myanmar’s Chin State. 

On the 8th of February, India's BJP government unilaterally decided to suspend the Free Movement Regime (FMR) between India and Myanmar. The decision includes terminating the open border that allowed people living near the Indo-Myanmar villages to travel up to 16km into each other’s countries with no visa requirements. The government also plans to fence the 1640km porous boundary that spans across the Indian states of Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Manipur - areas that unfortunately the rest of India remains unfamiliar and largely oblivious about.  

Initially introduced during the 1970s, the FMR later evolved in 2016 and 2018 under the ‘Act East’ policy, a diplomatic initiative by the Government of India to strengthen cultural, economic and strategic ties between South Asia and Southeast Asia. The FMR was promoted taking into consideration the artificial and arbitrary demarcations of colonial cartography, as well as the close knit ancestral, kinship, and familial ties between the communities residing in these borderlands. After Britain seized territories from the Burmese Konbaung dynasty, the treaty of Yandabo in 1826 was signed, marking the end of the first Anglo-Burmese war. This eventually led to the delineation of Burma from the Indian Empire on the 1st of April 1937, facilitating simpler governance of these territories by the British. 

Curtailing a curtailed border 

A local in Zokhawthar exclaimed, “Around 200-300 children cross borders to attend schools in Zokhawthar everyday” 

In Mizoram international border with Myanmar is a limited ‘open' border, the tiny bridge elevated over the river Tiau is what connects yet acts as a frontier for Zokhawthar and Rikhawdar. The 50-foot Bailey bridge contains two gates on either side, controlled independently by the Indian and Myanmar state, ensuring regulated access and exit. While the gate on the side of Myanmar stands wide open, its Indian counterpart remains nearly shut, only allowing a small pathway for people to pass one by one through a tiny gate constructed within the larger one. This restricted connectivity is indeed problematic for the people who are dependent on each other, for cross-border trade, agricultural supplies and also healthcare and education.  

Professor Sajal Nagre recalls the successionist history of Mizoram.  In his article, he writes about how independent India and its process of nation building involved ‘ruthless and repressive machinery’: the methods adopted to tackle crises and various uprisings mimicked European methods of dealing with dissent and rebellion. When the Mizo uprising occurred, the Indian government had already mastered handling insurgencies in places such as Kashmir, Nagaland and Tamil Nadu.  

The halting of the FMR and bolstering of border infrastructure is, rather predictably, backed up by anti-immigrant rhetoric. In addition, the government expresses concern over arms and drugs smuggling, claims that these regions are facing increased insurgencies from Junta militias that could be a threat to national security.

“We recognise the faces of people who cross frequently and let them pass but as soon as we see an unfamiliar face we check the documents and push them back” said the Border Police in Zokhawthar.  

The announcement of the closure of FMR has intensified security measures resulting in an increased presence of the Assam rifles, a centrally appointed paramilitary force, deployed everywhere in Mizoram. During my latest visit to Zokhawthar, I encountered various checkpoints. On my way back to the Champhai district from the Border town of Zokhawthar, I was fortunate to get a ride with a local family. However, their vehicle was stopped, and we were all required to step out and undergo individual frisking  while they searched the car’s trunk. The family later disclosed that such incidents are a daily occurrence and expressed their frustration. This practice is slowly creating an atmosphere of hyper vigilance, criminalising border crossings on the suspicion of locals being insurgents.  

Despite these strict measures adopted by the central government, strong feelings of belonging are still expressed on both sides. ‘They are our brothers, we speak the same language and we eat the same food’, a local in Mizoram told me while we discussed the FMR. This profound sense of unity was strongly asserted by the chief minister of Mizoram who defied the central government’s authority, refusing to deport the asylum seekers in Mizoram.  

The people of Mizoram strive for solidarity and try to maintain their ancestry with Myanmar, often providing humanitarian assistance to refugees who have escaped the civil war after the 2021 coup. Currently Mizoram hosts around 40,000 refugees who are settled in Zokhawthar inside makeshift camps. On the 16th of May peaceful rallies were organised where thousands took to the streets of Mizoram to protest against the revocation of the Free Movement Regime. For now, there has been no update on the smart border fencing project, meanwhile these protests and bonds still persist.   

 Hidden chains behind open borders in postcolonial states 

The Mizo-Chin people are clear: they never accepted the border during colonial times, and they shall not accept these restrictions in movement even now. On the 20th of May 2024, ZORO (Zomi reunification organization) published an article threatening the government to take up arms if they suspend the FMR and fence the border. ZORO is dedicated to reunifying the Zomi-Chin-Kuki-Mizo tribes across India, Bangladesh and Myanmar, aiming to unite them under one single administration.  

FMR is a unique feature, a ‘decolonial’ effort by the government attempting to redefine colonial borders. But an ‘open’ border in a postcolonial space does not necessarily mean it is a decolonized border. Considering the power dynamics connected with these borders, the arbitrary decision to open or close them by the central government, the heightened border securitization and the counter-insurgency/anti-immigrant rhetoric, one might wonder how any of this differs from the colonial apparatus. A quick look into the history of the Mizo uprising and the state’s response can tell you the decolonizing efforts are not as benevolent as they might seem, instead are methods to keep conflicts and anger against the government at bay. The most telling evidence on how border management regimes echo colonial ways of controlling these borderlands is the systematic exclusion of border residents in the decision-making process.  

It is necessary to unmask the reality of FMR, or any such disguise of decoloniality hidden behind open borders. When open borders are implemented in territories historically subjected to colonial rule, they are often presented as human-rights solutions, marketed as a way to finally break free from the shackles of a colonial past. However, when open borders are enacted within the global capitalist system, they act as a decoy, diverting attention from internal neocolonial interests hidden behind progressive and decolonial rhetoric, while simultaneously overshadowing local and indigenous struggles for sovereignty, resources and land rights. 

Simply opening the borders is not enough. In the case of Mizoram, the state continues to face significant challenges including neglect and isolation, insufficient transport networks, inadequate infrastructure, and high unemployment rates. These issues contributed to the dissatisfaction of border citizens alongside the forced division of their families and kins due to demarcated lands. The pressing question is: if the central government does proceed with the smart border fencing project regardless of the protests, what will be the cost, and who will fund this neo-colonial endeavor? 

Any comments about this post? Get in touch with us! Send us an email, or post a comment here or on Facebook. You can also tweet us.