The relationship between trauma and narrative: The ‘ship of fools’ narrative created by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Part 2

In part one of this two-part blog series, I outlined the link between trauma and unspeakability, and through reflecting on the film ‘Grenfell’ by Steve McQueen, I concluded that the six years since the Grenfell Tower fire have been marked by unspeakability. In this second part, I examine the narrative that is being created by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, a proceeding that was conducted during these six years, and argue that in a reality of unspeakability the narrative that is being created leaves unanswered the question of why the fire happened.

1. The narrative constructed by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (1)

Ship of fools

On 10 November 2022, as part of the ‘overarching closing statements’ stage of Phase 2 of the Inquiry, Mr Millett KC, Lead Counsel to the Inquiry from its outset, made his final submissions summarising his main arguments of the eight modules of Phase 2. In an overarching closing statements stage, the Lead Counsel and all core participants to the Inquiry summarise their main arguments, concluding the Inquiry’s proceeding. Therefore, the Lead Counsel’s overarching closing statements is a founded source through which to learn of the Inquiry’s narrative.

Mr Millett made the following submissions regarding the reasons for the fire:

"The reasons were many, complex and in many cases inextricably interlinked. Some had an immediately causative effect, and others less so. It is open to you on the evidence to conclude that there was a long run−up of incompetence and poor practices in the construction industry and the fire engineering and architects’ profession; weak and incompetent building control; cynical and possibly even dishonest practices in the cladding and insulation materials manufacturing sector; incompetence, weakness and malpractice by those responsible for testing and certifying those materials; the failure of central government to act, despite known risks; failures of competence, training and oversight within the TMO, and over it by RBKC; a failure by the LFB to learn the lessons of Lakanal, and other fires, and to train its operational staff to collect, understand and to act on the risks presented by modern construction methods and materials; risks well known to some, but not all, within that institution.

      And behind all of these discrete factors, there lay complex, opaque and piecemeal legislation, and an over−reliance by law and policymakers on guidance, some of which −− including the statutory guidance −− was ambiguous, dangerously out of date, and much of which was created by non−governmental bodies and influenced by commercial interests." [pp. 28-29] (emphasis mine)

The quoted paragraphs reveal two parts to the narrative. Firstly, we learn from the narrative that there is a pervasive culture of malpractice, weakness, and incompetence that characterises the conduct of all involved – corporates, the local authority, and the government alike. Secondly, we learn that this culture is enabled by a ‘complex, opaque and piecemeal legislation’ and ambiguous guidance. This narrative of a ‘ship of fools’ that was enabled by vague legislation and guidance, was expressed in these terms by Millett in his submissions. Millett used the phrase ‘ship of fools’ when arguing against central government that there is a causal link between this culture and the lack of regulation and efficient guidance:

"Why were all these individuals and organisations so lacking in competence in that single arena, fire safety under the Building Regulations? Why this ship of fools? It was clearly not a coincidence." [p. 69] (emphasis mine)

The extreme feature in the causes to the fire left unexplained: A multitude of fundamental failures in one single building

As seen above, the narrative that the overarching statements allude to is the culture/regulations narrative: the fire, according to the Inquiry, is an outcome of a failed and incompetent building-industry-culture that was created and enabled by vague regulations. However, when reading the overarching statements and the evidence presented to the Inquiry throughout the proceeding, we can learn that there is an extreme feature that characterises the causes that led to the fire which the incompetence of the industry alone cannot explain. The extreme feature is the fire being a result of a multitude of fundamental failures. These are a few of the fundamental failures that were revealed by the Inquiry as contributing to the causes leading to the fire: RBKC’s disregard to residents’ alerts on lack of safety for years; RBKC Building Control approving the renovation plan which lacked basic information and which included materials that did not stand safety tests; failures in procurement process leading to hiring companies without relevant experience in the renovation of high-rise buildings; the cladding of the building with combustible materials; lack of sprinklers; non fire-proof doors and broken lifts. The extreme case that Grenfell presents, cannot in my view be explained by a culture of incompetence alone. Grenfell cannot be seen as representative of a norm or a culture, neither in the UK in general nor in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea in particular. The narrative, as it stands, answers the question which failures happened, but it leaves unexplained the extreme feature of Grenfell, which is the question what can explain the concentration of so many fundamental failures in one single building.

2. The narrative constructed by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (2)

Social housing perceived as a secondary factor

Millett’s overarching closing statements reveal a third element to the narrative. For the Inquiry, Grenfell Tower is a high-rise building, similar to other high-rise buildings in the country, whether private or public. The fact that most of the Grenfell Tower residents were social housing residents is secondary in its narrative. Millett’s closing statements spanned more than 56 pages of the transcript, and covered the possible causality links between the conduct of the parties investigated and the fire. The possible blame of eleven parties was covered in the overarching closing submissions, including the local authority Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC, the owner of Grenfell Tower and the holder of duty of care towards its residents) and the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO, acting on behalf of RBKC). Yet Millett only mentioned the words ‘social housing’ twice, and only in relation to the TMO. The words were mentioned not to describe a failure related to the fact that the residents were in social housing, but to reiterate that the TMO deflects responsibility by arguing that their conduct was not exceptional when compared to other management organisations. The brief mention means that there is a high likelihood that a person listening to the statements without prior knowledge about Grenfell would not understand that Grenfell Tower was a social housing building.

Inability to examine whether the Human Rights Act 1998 has been breached

Not recognising social housing as a central factor prevents an effective examination of whether discrimination had any bearing on the circumstances that led to the fire that constituted a breach of the Human Rights Act 1998.

According to Article 2 of the Human Rights Act, the right to life is a protected human right. According to Article 14, discrimination on any ground in the level of protection afforded to the rights protected by the Act is prohibited. Recognising the centrality of social housing would lead to the examination of the following two questions: did discrimination in standards of treatment exist between social housing residents and private accommodation residents? Did it play a role in the circumstances leading to the loss of 72 lives? If the examination will reveal that discrimination existed and it led to the loss of lives, then the fire will have constituted a breach of Article 2 and Article 14 of the Human Rights Act. This possibility, which could have far-reaching effects, cannot be examined as long as social housing is perceived by the Inquiry to be a secondary factor in the narrative on the causes leading to the fire.

3. Main question left unexplained by the Inquiry

With the ‘ship of fools’—regulations narrative not answering the extreme feature of the causes leading to the fire, and the marginalisation of social housing as a central factor, the narrative created by the Inquiry does not provide an answer to the question why the fire happened. This sense of not knowing, six years on, why the fire happened is expressed in Paul Gilroy’s essay ‘Never Again Grenfell’ that accompanied the film’s exhibition:

"In spite of an apparently interminable official inquiry into how and why the deadly fire had happened, the facts cannot be examined as they should be. Their contestation by those who are likely to be judged culpable is secondary to the way they have been shrouded in mists of calculated misinformation. …

As a result, unlike the essential facts, the lines of responsibility for this crime are not well understood."

4. The missing link: institutional discrimination

The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry might provide a potential answer as to why one single site sees so many fundamental failures which can be the missing link in the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s narrative. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, established in July 1997 and completed in February 1999, investigated the reasons behind the failure of the metropolitan police to investigate the murder of Stephen Lawrence, an 18-year-old black teenager who was murdered by a group of white youth in London in 1993. The metropolitan police tried to argue that the failure was rooted in police common malpractice. However, this argument was rejected because the Inquiry realised that this standard of conduct does not reflect police practice when investigating murders of white people, and instead conducted a proficient investigation that led to the conclusion that the failures in Stephen Lawrence’s murder investigation were due to racism.

One of the main takeaways from that Inquiry is the understanding that institutional discrimination is expressed in the form of a drop in standards of conduct, from competence to incompetence. Discrimination leads to individuals, who otherwise act professionally and capably, diverting from this norm and acting incompetently as though the standards they have held have either disappeared or have been forgotten.

In relation to Grenfell, the needed investigation is to examine whether the concentration of fundamental failures in one single arena is representative of the overall norm of incompetence, as the Inquiry had stated, or of a diversion from an otherwise higher standard of conduct. A drop in standard - an indicator of institutional discrimination – could, if found, be the missing link in the Inquiry’s current narrative.

This investigation must take place especially regarding the local authority RBKC, the state agent that owns Grenfell Tower and that set the tone of the conduct of all parties involved. It should concern the question whether a difference in treatment by the RBKC exists, when providing social housing residents and private housing residents with the same services. As explained in Part 1, we are unable to know whether institutional discrimination played a part in the causes to the fire because the Government and the Inquiry have so far refused to investigate it.

The question of discrimination remaining unanswered and being at the heart of Grenfell is highlighted by Paul Gilroy:

"One basic question: ‘Who can be killed without any consequences?’ is therefore pending in the memory of Grenfell Tower just as it was in the long, multi-layered struggle over the 97 people who died on the terraces at Hillsborough. That question inclines us towards further inquir[i]es which promise to reveal the heart of the matter: Whose lives matter? Which deaths will be mourned? How can these acts of gratuitous killing be marked and remembered?"

5. Trauma and narrative

The Inquiry’s refusal to investigate institutional discrimination when it is clearly the elephant in the room, seen by all – the bereaved, survivors, North Kensington community, and the wider public – is a fundamental failure by the Inquiry. An answer that does not address the main feature of the fire, equals a lack of answer.

The legacy of the loss of 72 lives, the destruction of the lives of their families, and the harm caused to hundreds of more people, should be the advancement in our understanding of how institutional discrimination is exercised in everyday practices – a valuable understanding that could truly prevent the loss of more lives. Instead, in years marked by unspeakability, the Inquiry is constructing a narrative that is not reflective of the root causes of the fire and that further acts to create a cloud of mist over them.